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BOOK REVIEWS
A public policy in favor of allowing force on no greater provocation than
abusive or insulting language may be indicated by the statutes passed in at
least three Southern states, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. By these statutes
provocation by words alone may be shown as a defense to prosecutions for criminal assault. Miss. CoDE (1906) § 1501; Brown v. State, 74 Ala. 42 (1884); GA.
CoD (1933) § 26-1409; Murphy v. State, 92 Ga. 75, 17 S. E. 845 (1893); Behling
v. State, 110 Ga. 754, 36 S. E. 85 (1900). In Mississippi and Georgia the statutes,
though worded so as to apply to criminal actions only, have both been applied
to civil actions by the courts. Thomas v. Carter,148 Miss. 637, 114 So. 736 (1927) ;
Choate v. Pierce, 126 Miss. 209, 88 So. 627 (1921); Hutcheson v. Browning, 37
Ga. App. 276, 129 S. E. 125 (1925). In Louisiana, 1933, the court held that a
person can not sue where he gave provocation for the assault by words. Finkelstein v. Naihaus, 151 So. 686 (La. 1933).
In general, provocation may be shown in mitigation of damages, even when
the provocation consisted of words alone. In some jurisdictions it may be shown
in mitigation of damages, both compensatory and punitive. Palmer v. WinstonSalem Railway, 131 N. C. 250, 42 S. E. 604 (1902); Ward v. White, 86 Va. 212,
9 S. E. 104 (1889); Berkner v. Dannenberg, 116 Ga. 954, 43 S. E. 463, 60 L. R.
A. 559 (1903). In by far the majority of the states, however, it may beshown only
in mitigation of punitive damages. Donnelly v. Harris,41 fI1. 126 (1866); Mahoning Valley Ry. Co. v. De Pascale, 70 Ohio St. 179, 71 N. E. 633 (1903); Daniels
v. Starnes, 61 S. W. (2d) 548 (Texas, 1933); Morache v. Greenberg, 165 AtI.
684, 116 Conn. 549 (1933); Royer v. Belcher, 100 W. Va. 694, 131 S. E. 556, 47
A. L. R. 1089 (1926); Metzinger v. Perry, 197 Wis. 16, 221 N. W. 418 (1928);
Benjamin v. Walton, 181 Cal. 115, 183 Pac. 529 (1919); Bond v. Williams, 279
Mo. 215, 214 S. W. 202 (1919); Terry v. MRichardson, 123 S. C. 319, 116 S. E.
273 (1923). In those states which do not allow mere words to serve as a justifica-

tion of an assault and yet allow the provocation by the words to mitigate the
damages, both compensatory and exemplary, the courts are allowing the defendant
to do indirectly what they will not allow him to do directly which is, to say
the least, an illogical privilege. Undoubtedly the reason the courts allow the
mitigation of damages at all is because they feel that no one should be allowed
to profit by his own wrong. The law does not encourage those who go around
insulting others and later sue to recover the damages suffered through the assault
that they themselves provoked. Recognition is found in the old common law
which made it a disdemeanor to challenge another to fight. The courts in general, on the other hand, refuse to go so far as to say that words calculated
to provoke an assault will serve as its justification.
Frank E. Bright.

BOOK REVIEWS
CASES ON CODE PLEADING. By Archibald H. Throckmorton. Second Edition. St.
Paul: West Publishing Co. 1938.
The reader expects a review of a standard case book to be fascinating and instructive as well. However, such a result is almost impossible to attain because it
is necessary to present facts which in themselves are essentially valuable but
nevertheless unattractive to the reader's eye.
This is a collection of some three hundred and thirty cases covering seven
hundred and fifty-six pages, with an introductory essay on "History, Systems
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and Functions of Pleading," by Professor Charles E. Clark of Yale. In the footnotes references are made to some forty articles and notes upon important topics
from a dozen legal periodicals.
Briefly stated, the book treats of the subjects of, Parties, joinder and Splitting
of Causes of Action, Complaint, Demurrer, Answer, Reply and Supplemental
pleadings.
Is the work teachable? Only one who has tried it can answer with any degree
of assurance. The material seems sufficient and satisfactory for a successful subject. The cases chosen concern the most interesting and important questions in
the course. The footnotes are abstracted from works by such learned men as
Hinton, McCaskill, Cook, Sunderland and Clark. The puzzling problems of code
pleading are either clearly explained in the book or reference is made where further
knowledge can be acquired.
The book contains a number of recent cases including for example, those
landmarks in the development and interpretation of the New York and Illinois
Civil Practice Acts. In general, the cases have not appeared in other collections,
although many of them naturally have introduced some of these cases.
The excellent features of Professor Throckmorton's books are many. The
great variety of cases, new and old, present a wealth of teaching material. The
arrangement is good and there is enough material on each topic.
The material facts of a case, the decisive question in it, how this question
was reached, and with what final result, can be ascertained only from a careful reading of the whole case as given in the casebook. It is my personal opinion
that this is a factor, not only of this casebook alone, but all others as well, which
is subject to severe criticism. If an author insists on many long cases to bring
out a single point, the student's search for possible distinctions between the case
and other cases should be aided by short order ancillary cases.
Two features are notable in the cases in Professor Throckmorton's book, their
wide field of selection and the number of them which have appeared since 1900.
The larger number of cases come from New York, but the trans-Mississippi states
are represented with a sufficient number of cases as well.
Two other features of the book are deserving of notice. It gives at the opening of the more important chapters, the text of the enactments in a representative
number of the codes, east and west. These enactments are selected from some
of the older codes and from the recent New York and Illinois Civil Practice Acts.
The book has an Appendix containing the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
district courts of the United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia.
This is of practical value. Although the author has been sparing in the use of
forms, and not having an actual color of reality, nevertheless, the student should
pursue this knowledge through the books in order to familiarize himself with the
forms as used in his own jurisdiction.
The extracts from the various code provisions which appear at the beginning
of every chapter, in my humble estimation, constitute the outstanding feature
of the book. In this manner the student has a general idea of the topic which
the subsequent cases will cover.
On the whole, this is a good standard casebook, worthy of a place in the
American Casebook Series; it is as good as most of the books, and much better
than others.
James E. Bales.
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CoNprcT or CRaumAL LAws. By Edward S. Stimson. Chicago: The Founda-

tion Press, Inc. 1936.
This book, a fourth of a series on Conflict of Laws, was published by Professor
Stimson with a duality of purpose. Not only did he desire to state the law as
accurately as possible and cite all the authorities substantiating his statements,
but also the preface states his purpose to be "to make a thorough analysis of the
problem of jurisdiction over crime with a view to ascertaining and recommending
general principles to be applied in solving the problem." It is in this latter goal
that we find a unique study in the criminal law. To the practitioner and student
alike the book is of great value, but if not closely scrutinized some of the ideas
of the author, which are not the law but what Professor Stimson thinks the law
ought to be, will be accepted as dogma.
A long lin6 of precedent has established the rule that a criminal will be tried
only by the state in which he committed the crime or the state in which the effect of the crime took place. However, it is advocated in this book that the criminal be tried in any state where he is apprehended, or where it is convenient and
economical, and that that state apply the criminal law of the state where the criminal act occurred. In this way the Conflict of Law theory as promulgated in in personam actions would be used. It is pointed out this would defeat the obtrusive
decision of Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U. S. 66, 16 L. Ed. 717
(1860). The arguments given in support of such a proposition would be several;
double jeopardy would be eliminated, extradition would be made less important,
the defendant would know what law governed his acts and there would be less
complication in the law. However the criticism of the system would far outweigh the merits. What state would seek the honor of punishing at its own expense a crime committed in another jurisdiction when the howl for a reduction
of taxes is ever-increasing? If one state refused to pass a statute permitting such
an action, it would be the haven of all criminals, it would not be unlike the
distasteful condition of the divorce laws of the nation-where several states granting easy divorces have been the sanctuary of those evading the more stringent
laws. Therefore the theory presented here by this metaphysical jurist, Professor
Stimson, would have multiple bad results.
In reviewing the book one cannot help acknowledging the exhaustive research
and marvelous study that the author has brought to bear on the subject. Some
1200 cases have been studied and been made authoritative, statutes instituting
modern trends have been commented upon, and the fifteen separate crimes which
have been examined lend a great deal to this book. One of the most novel and
interesting phases of the book is the analysis of the crimes committed through
agents and its relation to all fields of law.
The three-fold division of the book into a study of decisions in regard to
specific crimes, in regard to crimes on water, and in regard to forfeiture of property ordinates the book in a scholarly fashion. In each case the law is pointed
out as being what it ought to be and in relation to property, it is the place where
the owner of the property is at the time of the seizure. Since the book is specialized
in the field of criminal law, it is highly imformative on particular points. For
that reason it is of unusual value to the student. Both the members of the
profession and the law students are, therefore, deeply indebted for this contribution in the field of Conflict of Laws, and should express a desire that this series
by Professor Stimson be continued into other fields of conflicts.

John De Mots.
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THE LAw oF NATIONS. By Marcellus Donald A. R. von Redlich. Second Edition.
World League For Permanent Peace. 1937.
The Law of Nations is made up of those principles and rules which civilized
nations have agreed to be applicable to them in their mutual relationship, and
only if nations abide by these rules which they have accepted will universal peace
be attained. Disputes in the past between nations have many times been settled
only by resorting to violence and bloodshed instead of by the principles of justice
found in the Law of Nations. It is the author's purpose in this book to set forth
the means and the machinery the world has created by treaties and custom for
the amicable settlement of international differences, which consist of diplomacy
and settlement by arbitration or by an international court.
In considering diplomacy the history of diplomacy is shown from the Pater
Patratus of Rome who sought peace for the Romans by diplomatic negotiations
and declared war by hurling a spear across the frontier of, the enemy, through
the early American diplomatic history, to the history of the establishment of the
modern permanent diplomatic missions. Then in further consideration of diplomacy
the modern status of diplomatic officers is interestingly set forth which includes
the circumstances under which a nation may receive or reject a diplomatic representative, and the rights, duties, privileges and immunities of diplomatic officers.
The author rightly observes that the settlement of international disputes by
diplomacy has not been entirely satisfactory since diplomatic representatives in
the past have fomented as many disputes as they have settled, and that the
determination of the respective rights of nations would be better accomplished
by the submission of differences to a court as the disputes between individuals
within nations are settled.
In view of the world's need for the judicial settlement of international disputes the world's facilities for the settling of such disputes in a judicial manner
is considered. Arbitration, where it has been used, has had marked success in the
maintenance of peace. At present the League of Nations has established the Permanent Court of International Justice for use by the League members in the
settlement of disputes before the greatest jurists of the nations of the world.
Proper space is given to an exposition of the nature of the Court, the history
of the League, and its present organization, and the author recognizes the inability of the Court to enforce its decrees. He shows, however, that all early law
courts were deficient in this regard and expresses the hope that mankind will
realize that the settlement of international disputes by law and pustice is the
only method of settlement in keeping with man's dignity. He feels that the
United States would be a great factor in the maintenance of universal peace if
it were to enter the League of Nations, not to become an international policeman, but to vitalize the League and the Court by her prestige. The United States
necessarily must be interested in world peace, and that can be most easily expressed by cooperation in that behalf *ith the other Great Powers through the
League which the United States so manifestly aided in molding.
Of considerable interest to students of Constitutional Law in particular is the
author's discussion of the treaty-making powers of the United States wherein
he sets forth the extent of that power, the relation of treaties to federal statutes,
and the binding force of treaties upon the states. Consideration is also given to
the circumstances under which a treaty may be terminated and to the question
of whether all treaties between belligerent nations are automatically terminated
by the outbreak of war.
The mechanics of the book make study of the subject-matter most easy. Division of the book is by chapters with further division of the chapters by numbered
and titled sections. Further aids are a complete index, an extensive bibliography
affording means for exhaustive research on the subject, and an appendix contain-
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ing the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Statute and the revision in the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and other Treaties referred to in the text and cited as appearing in the appendix. Throughout the text
are excerpts from the leading writers in the field of International Law and citations to United States Supreme Court cases. A notable feature of the book itself
is its extreme light weight although more than six hundred pages long.
Lastly, Marcellus Donald A. R. von Redlich must be highly commended for
the clear, interesting and readable fashion in which he has fulfilled his purpose
of presenting the Law of Nations as it actually is, and not as it ought to be,
for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The reader is forcibly made to
realize the agencies at hand in the world for the easy and sane dissblving of such
international differences, and how unreasonable is the resort to war with these
agencies existing.
William R. Bowes, Jr.

VAIwrry oF FoRmN DIVoRcs. By Hamilton Vreeland, Jr.1 Chicago: Callaghan & Company. 1938.

"Concerning the extraterritorial recognition of divorce decrees there has existed
and still exists unfortunate discord, with resulting lamentable social confusion and
hardship." 2 To bring order out of the chaos of decisions Dr. Vreeland has examined all the decisions and other authorities on the problems which have been
found in Anglo-American and Continental jurisprudence. 3 Decisions of courts,
statutes, treaties, and the thoughts of jurists have been examined, compiled,
evalued, and criticized in an illuminating style which has been coupled with many
technical advantages of law book construction to make the fruits of the author's
research most usable to the practicing attorney.
English authorities are examined in Part One for the avowed reason that the
law of England on this problem is simpler than that of other jurisdictions.4 It
is seen that the English courts have adopted the view that a divorce need not
have been obtained after personal service upon the defendant to entitle such
decree to recognition as valid in England, because the case of Le Mesurier v. Le
Mesurier5 held that all that was required was that the divorce have been granted
at the true domicil of the parties. As to the recognition accorded a separation
decree, however, the English court in Armytage v. Armytage 6 refused to grant
extraterritorial recognition where there had been no personal service upon the
defendant in the jurisdiction handing down the decree. The apparent social anomaly whereby the decree of less magnitude in the eyes of society requires greater
notice to the defendant is satisfactorily explained by Dr. Vreeland by an exposition of the nature of the two decrees with a finding that the divorce decree
attacks the status of the parties created by the marriage, and therefore a court
1 Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of America.
2 P. liii.
a Included are: Law of every jurisdiction of the United States including that
of the federal courts; the law of England and of certain British possessions;
and the law of every country on the Continent of Europe, except that of Soviet
Russia.
4 Which if true, is true only by comparison, as no existent theory in this
field may be termed simple.
5 [1895] A. C. 517.
6 [1898) P. 178.
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to successfully dissolve such status, or res, must have jurisdiction over that status,
which jurisdiction is determined by the location of the true domicil of the parties.
In the instance of the separation decree the res is neither attacked nor affected,
and consequently for such personal adjustment between the parties personal jurisdiction is all that is required.
The difficulty which ordinarily arises upon permitting the wife to adopt a
separate domicil from her husband is circumvented by the refusal of the English
courts to recognize such a right in the wife. The injustice of the arbitrary presumption that the domicil of the wife always follows that of the husband is recognized by the author who suggests as a remedy the adoption of a theory that
the presumption becomes inoperative when the husband deserts the wife, but that
it remains operative when she deserts him.7 A solution of this vexing problem
seems necessary, and the substitute theory advanced by the author appears sound
and not in violation of any legal theory.
From a discussion of the in rem theory of the Le Mesurier case and the in
personam theory of the Armytage case, the author in Part Two enters into an
examination of the extraterritorial recognition of a foreign divorce under the
constitution of the United States. It is seen that the United States Supreme Court
in its application of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution
has been deaf to pleas of divers writers who seek to compel the Supreme Court
to declare whether a suit for a divorce is in rem or in personam.
Taking four of the leading decisions it is discovered that "the Haddock 8
case may be . . . considered to have been decided on the ground that there was
no jurisdiction either in personam or in rem; the Atherton 9 case on the ground
that there was jurisdiction in rem; the Andrews 10 case on the ground that domicil,
as conclusive evidence of the absence of fraud against the state of citizenship, was
not present; and the Cheever 11 case on the ground that there was jurisdiction
in personam, with domicil established as the conclusive evidence of the absence
of such fraud." 12 From these cases and others the author logically concludes that
there is no necessity for a declaration by the Supreme Court that a divorce action
is either in rem or in personam, since all that is required to entitle a decree to
extraterritorial recognition under the Constitution is that there exist in the court
of the original decree some jurisdiction of either type and no fraud.
Part Three covers the law of conflict of laws in the United States. In this
extensive section the theory adopted by the courts of each state in the United
States is evaluated and set forth in a convenient alphabetical arrangement by
states. In addition the theory adopted by the American Law Institute in the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws is presented and criticized along with
the Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act, prepared by the National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, which is included although it is not law at
present in a single state. The material summarized and considered for each state
does not purport to be exhaustive of the law of that jurisdiction,13 but the author
has discerningly selected only the leading cases and only a sufficient number of
those to present the complete theory of each jurisdiction.
Apparently the book was written before the decision of Jardine v. Jardine14
was handed down. However, it is suggested that in the event of a reprinting of
7 P. 18.
8
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1905).
9 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1900).
10 Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (1902).
11 Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (1869).
12 P. 35.
13 Although in many instances it is exhaustive.
14 291 Ill. App. 152, 9 N. E. (2d) 645 (1937).
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this book this recent case should be included, not because it alters the Illinois
rule as set forth by the author, but because it sustains that view with greater
clarity and in a more exhaustive opinion than many of the cases considered.
Part Four sets forth the European law under the Hague Treaty of June 12,
1902. In it the provisions of the treaty are presented along with the names of
countries which are signatories thereof, the comments of the publicists upon it,
and the cases construing the treaty.
Paft Five presents the European law aside from the treaty considered in Part
Four. In it is organized, in an alphabetical arrangement by countries, the divers
legal theories adopted in the jurisdictions considered.
In Part Six the author presents his conclusions formulated after his exhaustive
consideration of the authorities. These conclusions are splendidly arranged, the
fundamental problems are restated, and there is a list of jurisdictions grouped
according to the legal theories adopted by them in the recognition of foreign
divorces.
As the author's constructive solution of the problem he suggests a treaty, a
draft of which he includes in Part Six, adopting standards for the extraterritorial
recognition of divorce decrees, which if ratified by the United States would
automatically become binding upon the courts of each state, thus achievifg uniformity within the United States in one fell swoop. The authority for this proposition of "legislation by treaty" is, in the main, based upon the decision of Mr.
justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland,15 and although Dr. Vreeland, in his
argument and suggested draft of the treaty, satisfies all the requirements of that
case, it seems that it is one of Mr. justice Holmes' poorest opinions. So indefinite
and tenuous is it that it is believed that upon this case alone the "jurisprudes" of
the realistic school of jurisprudence could accord Justice Holmes membership in
their school, which school has for its one universal attribute the fear of all its
members of being tied down to anything said by them. Admittedly, "legislation
by treaty" is a solution which possibly could be used in the manner suggested,
but too great hopes should not be held out for it.
Unintentionally, perhaps, this book presents by implication a definite condemnation of the practice of divorce as it exists in this country today. One cannot
peruse it for long without a realization of the catastrophic results that are attendant upon the so-called "society" or "conventional" divorces which in so few
instances are upheld when attacked in a court of law. The results of ineffective
decrees are universally disastrous, children often are rendered illegitimate, and
divorced parties contracting a subsequent marriage are subject to prosecution for
bigamy and adultery. It is urged that any lawyer, forced to procure the dissolution of a marriage, should be compelled to read this book before any steps are
taken, and since this book has made the necessary information available, any
lawyer who assists a client in procuring a divorce which is not later entitled to
universal extraterritorial recognition should be held liable to his client in a
negligence action for being remiss in his knowledge of the law.
As might be inferred from what has been said in review of this book, it is
structurally quite well written, the numerous summaries, the alphabetical arrangement of the law in juirisdictions, and a reserved, incisive style all grace the
book. The legal profession needs more of such books that are scholarly in thought
and expression, but which have been kept off the market by publishers seeking
works shallower in thought but covering a wider scope and subject to a speedier
turnover.
The method of citation employed differs from that found in books of recent
years, in that the citations are included in the text rather than in footnotes. The
15

252 U. S.416 (1919).
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form of citation of cases could stand definite improvement, for, throughout the
work cases are cited often without the unofficial citation, sometimes without the
official citation, and when both are given there is no consistency as to which
comes first. The cases are all properly cited in the table of cases in the front of
the book, and the author explains in his introduction 16 that the reason for the
incomplete citations throughout the text itself was his lack of access to all the
compilations of cases. Such statement explains but does not excuse the laxity in
this matter and does not justify the failure to make the simple mechanical corrections necessary.
James Joseph Kearney.
Chicago, Illinois.

16 P. liv.

